Agent incident · Sep 28, 2026

AWS AgentCore. The access path.

A prompt in a support ticket led to a vaulted credential in process memory. The vault did its job. The credential still left in one HTTP POST, and it belonged to a service account.

support ticketinstructions hidden in HTML commentsEntry
agentaccepts the tool call, runs a command
shell toolon by default, root in the harness
process heap/proc/1/mem, scanned for JWT patterns
service jwtvaulted credential, plus the MCP URL
customer datareplayed from outside AWSReached
SEP 28, 2026

The record

Entry point. support ticket, instructions hidden in HTML comments.

The identity in the middle. The operator service account whose JWT the agent runtime held, plus the MCP URL beside it.

What was reached. customer data, replayed from outside AWS.

AT A GLANCE

A prompt in a support ticket led to a vaulted credential in process memory.

PATH

The path, step by step.

Taken from the published reporting. Nothing here is reconstructed.

StepRole in the pathWhat the reporting records
support ticketEntryinstructions hidden in HTML comments
agentStepaccepts the tool call, runs a command
shell toolStepon by default, root in the harness
process heapStep/proc/1/mem, scanned for JWT patterns
service jwtStepvaulted credential, plus the MCP URL
customer dataReachedreplayed from outside AWS
BREAKPOINT

Where a breakpoint would have been

The shell tool that was on by default in the harness. The vault held: the credential was only reachable because the agent could run a command and read /proc/1/mem. Taking default shell access away closes the path before the token is ever in reach.

A breakpoint is the single change that closes a path with the least disruption. Read how that is chosen in the breakpoint page. The full narrative is in the teardown.

ELMOZ ASSESSMENT

6 steps from entry to data.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Where this comes from.

Every field on this page is taken from the published reporting below. The breakpoint assessment is Elmoz reading that path, not a statement about what the affected organisation did.

Unit 42, Palo Alto Networks · CloudTech News · Cybernews · AWS AgentCore Identity documentation

FAQ

Questions, answered.

The two questions this record answers.

What was the entry point in the AWS AgentCore incident?

The published path starts at support ticket, instructions hidden in HTML comments.

What did it reach?

The last step in the published path is customer data, replayed from outside AWS.

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