Nx s1ngularity. The access path.
A trojanized npm package used installed AI CLIs to collect secrets. A compromised npm package, AI coding tools and the credentials within their reach.
The record
Entry point. nx-package, trojanized version on npm.
The identity in the middle. The AI CLI own permissions, invoked with a flag that skips the permission checks.
What was reached. secrets collected from the developer machine.
A trojanized npm package used installed AI CLIs to collect secrets.
The path, step by step.
Taken from the published reporting. Nothing here is reconstructed.
| Step | Role in the path | What the reporting records |
|---|---|---|
| nx-package | Entry | trojanized version on npm |
| postinstall | Step | payload runs on install |
| ai-cli | Step | claude / gemini / q, if present |
| --yolo scan | Reached | permission checks skipped, secrets collected |
Where a breakpoint would have been
Allowing that flag on a machine that holds secrets. The payload did not break the CLI, it asked it politely with the wrong argument.
A breakpoint is the single change that closes a path with the least disruption. Read how that is chosen in the breakpoint page. The full narrative is in the teardown.
4 steps from entry to data.
Where this comes from.
Every field on this page is taken from the published reporting below. The breakpoint assessment is Elmoz reading that path, not a statement about what the affected organisation did.
Questions, answered.
The two questions this record answers.
What was the entry point in the Nx s1ngularity incident?
The published path starts at nx-package, trojanized version on npm.
What did it reach?
The published path ends at secrets collected from the developer machine.
Other incidents.
Same database, different path shape.
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